

Robustness of onionlike correlated networks against targeted attacksToshihiro Tanizawa,^{1,*} Shlomo Havlin,² and H. Eugene Stanley³¹*Kochi National College of Technology, 200-1 Monobe-Otsu, Nankoku, Kochi 783-8508, Japan*²*Minerva Center and Department of Physics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel*³*Center for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215, USA*

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Recently, it was found by Schneider *et al.* [*Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA* **108**, 3838 (2011)], using simulations, that scale-free networks with “onion structure” are very robust against targeted high degree attacks. The onion structure is a network where nodes with almost the same degree are connected. Motivated by this work, we propose and analyze, based on analytical considerations, an onionlike candidate for a nearly optimal structure against simultaneous random and targeted high degree node attacks. The nearly optimal structure can be viewed as a set of hierarchically interconnected random regular graphs, the degrees and populations of whose nodes are specified by the degree distribution. This network structure exhibits an extremely assortative degree-degree correlation and has a close relationship to the “onion structure.” After deriving a set of exact expressions that enable us to calculate the critical percolation threshold and the giant component of a correlated network for an arbitrary type of node removal, we apply the theory to the cases of random scale-free networks that are highly vulnerable against targeted high degree node removal. Our results show that this vulnerability can be significantly reduced by implementing this onionlike type of degree-degree correlation without much undermining the almost complete robustness against random node removal. We also investigate in detail the robustness enhancement due to assortative degree-degree correlation by introducing a joint degree-degree probability matrix that interpolates between an uncorrelated network structure and the onionlike structure proposed here by tuning a single control parameter. The optimal values of the control parameter that maximize the robustness against simultaneous random and targeted attacks are also determined. Our analytical calculations are supported by numerical simulations.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Many complex systems in real world can be modeled by complex networks [1–11]. Generally speaking, the cooperative performance of complex systems fundamentally relies on the global connectivity of their components. These complicated systems are, however, usually placed in an ever-changing external environment where the components or the connections could be constantly added, eliminated, or changed. Such changes may potentially affect the global connectivity of the network under consideration to the extent in which the global connectivity could be completely lost and the system represented by the network will lose its functionality. The analysis of the response of the global connectivity caused by the alteration of the network, or targeted attacks, has been therefore one of the main issues of the complex network analysis.

Most of the existing theoretical studies on the robustness of complex networks depend only on the degree distribution [5–31]. However, as noted by Newman, networks in real world exhibit rather strong tendency, or correlation, in the connection between nodes of different degrees [32]. He introduced the terms, assortative and disassortative correlations, to describe the tendency of nodes in a network to make connections between the same degree and between different degrees, respectively, and calculated how the giant component collapse for specific kinds of correlated networks against random node removal. Newman applied the generating function formalism

and showed the enhancement of the resiliency of networks with assortative degree-degree correlation.

In addition to Newman’s pioneering work, there are few theoretical works on robustness analysis including degree-degree correlations [33–36]. Among these, Goltsev *et al.* focused on the evaluation of critical exponents of correlated complex networks in the vicinity of node percolation transition for the case of random node removal [34]. Here we extend their formalism and proceed to the robustness analysis of a correlated complex network against arbitrary types of node removal.

Recently, Schneider *et al.* developed an interesting numerical approach for enhancing network robustness against high-degree node removal [37,38]. They start from an uncorrelated random network with a given degree distribution. Next, they randomly choose two pairs of links and exchange the destinations of the two links between them keeping the overall degree distribution unchanged. If this exchange improves the robustness of the network against targeted node removal, the exchange is accepted. By repeating this procedure, the robustness of the network is enhanced step by step. They applied this method to several types of networks with broad degree distributions and found that the final robust networks have a common “onionlike” topology consisting of a core of highly connected nodes hierarchically surrounded by rings of nodes with decreasing degree [37,38]. In each ring most of the nodes are of the same degree. A numerical method that improves the convergence to the onion structure is reported by Wu and Holme recently [39].

Motivated by the onionlike topology, we study here analytically the robustness of a family of such systems. In our approach we obtain analytical expressions for the

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critical threshold and for the giant components, where the degree-degree correlation is fully incorporated. Due to the analytical approach, a statistical treatment over a large number of realizations as done in computer simulations is not needed to obtain definite results. Nevertheless both analytical and simulation approaches are necessary and complementary, in particular, for testing the analytical approach. Interestingly, the optimal structure we find here against simultaneous random and targeted high degree node removals is very similar to the “onionlike” structure found by Schneider *et al.* [37]. The optimal structure obtained consists of hierarchically and weakly interconnected random regular graphs.

The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we derive a set of analytical equations for the critical node threshold and the giant component fraction for an arbitrary type of node removal where the degree-degree correlation is fully incorporated. We begin our analysis in Sec. III by presenting a simple theoretical argument to derive the optimal network structure against targeted high degree node removal. In Sec. IV, we describe the properties of a set of separated random regular graphs as the first step to understand the structure of the optimal network described in the previous section. Support of our analytical results by numerical simulations is also presented. In Sec. V we analyze the properties of interconnected random regular graphs of different degrees k by introducing a joint degree probability matrix that can describe the transition between a set of separated random regular graphs and a completely uncorrelated single random network by tuning a single control parameter under the condition of having a fixed degree distribution. The optimal values of the control parameter that maximize the robustness against simultaneous random and targeted high-degree node attacks is determined. In Sec. VI we summarize the results.

II. THEORY

We start from the joint degree-degree probability matrix, $P(k, k')$, which is the probability that a randomly chosen link emanates from a k -degree node and ends at a k' -degree node. In this article, we consider only the cases of undirected networks, where the symmetry $P(k, k') = P(k', k)$ holds. The sum of $P(k, k')$ over k' is the probability that a randomly chosen link starts from a k -degree node. It is related to the probability density of the degree distribution $P(k)$, through the relation $\sum_{k'} P(k, k') = kP(k)/\langle k \rangle$, where $\langle k \rangle$ is the average degree. By definition, $\sum_k P(k) = 1$. Note that the sum $\sum_{k'} P(k, k')$ has to be fixed if we fix the degree distribution $P(k)$. The conditional probability $P(k'|k)$ that a randomly chosen link emanating from a k -degree node leads to a k' -degree node is defined by $P(k'|k) \equiv P(k, k')/\sum_{k'} P(k, k') = P(k, k')/(kP(k)/\langle k \rangle)$.

When the nodes of a network are removed according to the degree of nodes, the remaining fraction of k -degree nodes is reduced by a factor b_k ($0 \leq b_k \leq 1$) from the original fraction $P(k)$. The total remaining fraction of nodes, p , is calculated by $p = \sum_k b_k P(k)$.

The giant component in a complex network is the largest cluster of connected nodes. Its relative size in the network, S , remains finite as the total number of nodes N becomes infinite. Nonzero values of S indicate a macroscopic connectivity of the network under consideration.

To calculate the critical value of the remaining fraction of nodes p_c , above which the giant component S begins to take a nonzero value, we extend the generating function method [16,34] by incorporating the degree-degree correlation under an arbitrary way of node removal. Let x_k be the probability that a randomly chosen link from a k -degree node does not lead to the giant component. Under the condition that the network only consists of trees, which is justified in the limit of $N \rightarrow \infty$, the probabilities x_k ($k = m, m+1, \dots, K$), for nonzero values of b_k , and the node fraction of the giant component S are determined by the following set of equations:

$$x_k = 1 - \sum_{k'} b_{k'} P(k'|k) + \sum_{k'} b_{k'} P(k'|k)(x_{k'})^{k'-1}, \quad (1)$$

$$S = p - \sum_k b_k P(k)(x_k)^k = \sum_k b_k P(k)(1 - (x_k)^k). \quad (2)$$

Obviously, $x_k = 1$ for removing all k -degree nodes ($b_k = 0$). Note that these equations contain the remaining fraction of k -degree nodes b_k . Equations (1) and (2) are a necessary extension of existing works in order to investigate all types of node removal. The degree-degree correlation is included in the conditional probability $P(k'|k)$.

Below the critical remaining fraction of nodes, all x_k 's are equal to one and it follows from Eq. (2) that $S = 0$ (no giant component). At criticality where the giant component emerges, at least one of x_k 's takes a value slightly smaller than one. In the vicinity of the critical point, we assume $x_k = 1 - y_k$ and expand Eq. (1) in terms of infinitesimally positive quantities y_k . The equation obtained by this expansion becomes

$$y_k = \sum_{k'} B_{kk'} y_{k'} + O(y_k^2), \quad (3)$$

where the “branching matrix” $B_{kk'}$ is defined by $B_{kk'} \equiv b_{k'} P(k'|k)(k' - 1)$. The eigenvalues of the branching matrix are all non-negative and can be ordered according to their values. The critical point can be obtained by the point at which the largest eigenvalue of $B_{kk'}$ becomes unity [34].

As we will show in Sec. IV, we can also calculate the critical exponent β defined by $S \sim |p - p_c|^\beta$ in the vicinity of the critical point.

III. THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE

Let us begin by reviewing the robustness of random regular graphs, which are networks that consist of only nodes with the same degree k . Such networks serve as components in the structure studied in this paper.

Since all nodes in a random regular graph have the same degree k , there is no difference between random and targeted attacks. It is well known from percolation theory that a random regular graph with degree $k \geq 2$ contains a single giant component when the remaining node fraction after random removal of nodes exceeds the critical threshold $p_c = 1/(k - 1)$. It should be pointed out that the critical node threshold for the random regular graph for $k = 2$ is one. This means that the giant component for a random regular graph with $k = 2$ is always critical and collapses as soon as few nodes are removed. Because of this criticality, the giant component fraction S of a $k = 2$ random regular graph is not unity but close to 0.8 [40].

The robustness of a given network depends on the method of node removal. For example, scale-free networks are almost completely robust against random node removal while they are extremely vulnerable against targeted removal of high-degree nodes [13,14,16,17]. The results for the robustness are, however, derived for random networks and thus are based only on the degree distribution. It is interesting, therefore, to clarify to what extent we are able to improve the robustness of a complex network against a targeted attack by introducing the degree-degree correlation while keeping the network degree distribution unchanged.

With this in mind, we focus on the improvement of the robustness of complex networks against targeted high-degree node attack. We limit our analysis to networks where the number of k -degree nodes decreases with increasing k . In a targeted high-degree attack, all nodes that have higher degrees than a certain value are eliminated. Removing a node also eliminates all the edges attached to it. Since the edges are connected with the remaining lower degree nodes, the elimination of those edges undermines the global connectivity of the remaining lower degree node component. In order to minimize such undermining effects as much as possible, the number of edges that connect removed higher degree nodes and the remaining lower degree nodes should be minimized as much as possible. Hence the following requirement should be fulfilled.

Requirement. The k -degree nodes should not be connected to nodes with degree k' lower than k ($k' < k$).

This requirement yields that most of the edges should connect nodes of the same degree. Thus the optimal structure built up from a set of random regular (RR) graphs naturally emerges. To form an entirely connected single network, these RR graphs must be connected with one another. The most robust network against a targeted attack with a given degree distribution can, therefore, be constructed by the following procedure.

(1) Prepare a suitable number of nodes for each degree according to the given degree distribution. We assume that the number of nodes for each degree is so large that all edges can find nodes to be attached in both end points.

(2) Let the smallest degree be m and begin to construct the network from the m -degree component, which is the last remaining component for targeted high-degree node removal. If the requirement is completely fulfilled, no edges of the m -degree component are eliminated by targeted removal of nodes with degree larger than but not equal to m . The last remaining m -degree component forms, therefore, an RR graph of degree m .

(3) Next, attach the nodes with degree $m + 1$. According to the requirement, the attached $(m + 1)$ -degree nodes cannot be connected to the (smaller) m -degree component. Thus all $(m + 1)$ -degree nodes should be connected with one another and form an RR graph of degree $(m + 1)$.

Up to this point, the network consists of two separated RR graphs with degree m and $m + 1$. However, to make a single connected network we have to connect these two components. To fulfill the requirement as much as possible under the condition of the fixed degree distribution, we break two edges, one of which is in the RR graph of degree m and the other of which is in the RR graph of degree $m + 1$, and rewire these

two edges. Note that this rewiring does not change the degree distribution.

(4) Attaching the nodes with the next larger degree, $m + 2$ can be performed in the same way. First, following the requirement, these nodes should be connected with one another. Hence, an RR graph with degree $m + 2$ emerges. Next, to make a single connected network under the conditions of the requirement and the fixed degree distribution, two edges in the RR graph of degree $m + 1$ and the RR graph of degree $m + 2$ are broken and rewired.

By repeating this process up to the nodes with the largest degree K , we reach the structure in which RR graphs with degrees hierarchically up from m to K are minimally interconnected. This structure has a close resemblance with the robust “onionlike” structure found using numerical simulations by Schneider *et al.* [37,38].

In the following sections, we investigate the properties of this structure, which we also refer to as the “onionlike” structure.

IV. ANALYSIS OF SEPARATED RANDOM REGULAR GRAPHS

Let us begin with the case of a correlated network specified by a delta functionlike joint degree probability matrix,

$$P(k, k') = \frac{k P(k)}{\langle k \rangle} \delta_{kk'}. \quad (4)$$

This joint degree probability matrix leads to the conditional probability that is a complete delta function: $P(k'|k) = \delta_{kk'}$. In this network, only nodes with the same degree are connected. The whole network is therefore a set of random regular (RR) graphs of all degrees of nodes from m to K where each degree fraction is specified by the degree distribution $P(k)$. In Fig. 1, we show an example of a set of RR graphs specified by Eq. (4).

Since the onion structure proposed in the previous section consists of minimally connected RR graphs, we expect that the properties of this structure should be almost identical to a set of separated RR graphs described by Eq. (4). This is one of the reasons we begin our analysis with a set of separated RR graphs.

Strictly speaking, there is no global giant component in this network structure, since all RR graphs are separated. We assume that the sum of the giant components of each RR graph to be the “virtual” giant component in this case. This definition of the “virtual” giant component naturally reflects the “real” giant component when we add a minimal number of connections, or “bridges,” between these RR graphs.

The branching matrix $B_{kk'}$ for this set of RR graphs is diagonal with the diagonal elements, $B_{kk} = b_k(k - 1)$, which are identical to the eigenvalues of the branching matrix [see Eq. (3)]. Thus each RR graph with degree k contained in this network becomes critical when the remaining fraction of this mode b_k takes the critical value,

$$b_k^* = \frac{1}{k - 1} \quad (k \geq 2). \quad (5)$$

When nodes are removed starting from the highest to lower degrees, the b_k 's of the removed degrees become zero. The




FIG. 1. (Color online) An example of a set of separated random regular graphs from $k = 2$ to $k = 5$. The total node number $N = 524$ and the node number for each random regular graph is determined by the power-law degree distribution, $P(k) \propto k^{-\lambda}$ with $\lambda = 2.6$. Notice that the graph for $k = 2$ is composed of separated rings, which can be fragmented by removing a tiny amount (zero fraction) of nodes. This means that the giant component of the random regular graph for $k = 2$ is always at the edge of criticality, as indeed predicted by Eq. (5).

last remaining fraction of nodes is that of the minimum degree m , and the disappearance of the giant component for this minimum degree indicates the collapse of the finally remaining “virtual” giant component. This occurs at

$$b_m = b_m^* = \frac{1}{m-1}, \quad b_k = 0 \quad (k > m). \quad (6)$$

Thus the node removal threshold for targeted attack on high-degree nodes of this extremely assortative network becomes

$$p_c = b_m^* P(m) = \frac{P(m)}{m-1}. \quad (7)$$

At the emergence of the giant component, when $p \gtrsim p_c$, the node fraction of the giant component S is characterized by the critical exponent, β , as $S \sim |p - p_c|^\beta$. Using the exact equations (1) and (2), we can also evaluate the value of β as follows.

We note again that the case, $m = 2$, is a little tricky. In the first place, as we can see from Eq. (7), the giant component of the regular graph of the smallest degree does not emerge until all the nodes with degree two are filled ($b_2 = 1$). In other words, the giant component suddenly disappears as soon as any single node of the smallest degree two is removed. Thus the percolation transition in this case is discontinuous and a finite value of S suddenly appears at $p_c = P(2)$. Second, the giant component for $k = 2$ is always critical and only about

80% of the nodes of this smallest degree participate in the giant component [40]. The rest of the nodes of $k = 2$ form tiny rings, which do not contribute to the giant component.

For $m \geq 3$, the transition is continuous at $p_c = P(m)/(m-1)$. In this case, we can also evaluate the critical exponent β as follows. For $p \gtrsim p_c$, nontrivial solutions for Eq. (1), which is

$$x_k = 1 - b_k(1 - (x_k)^{k-1}) \quad (8)$$

in this case, emerge. Let us assume $x_m = 1 - \varepsilon$, where $\varepsilon \gtrsim 0$, in the equation for the lowest degree m , and expand Eq. (8) up to the second order of ε . This gives

$$\varepsilon = \frac{2}{m-2} \left\{ 1 - \frac{1}{b_m(m-1)} \right\} + O(\varepsilon^2). \quad (9)$$

Since only the subgraph of the lowest degree m exists at the criticality, the remaining node fraction is $p = b_m P(m)$; therefore $p - p_c = (b_m - b_m^*)P(m)$. Notice that $b_m^* = 1/(m-1)$. Thus we can rewrite Eq. (9) as

$$\varepsilon = \frac{2}{b_m^* P(m)(m-2)} |p - p_c| + O(|p - p_c|^2). \quad (10)$$

Together with Eq. (2), which is

$$S = b_m P(m)(1 - (x_m)^m) \quad (11)$$

in this extremely assortative case, we obtain

$$S = \frac{2m}{m-2} |p - p_c| + O(|p - p_c|^2). \quad (12)$$

This means $\beta = 1$. It is interesting that in the limit $m \rightarrow \infty$,

$$S \approx 2|p - p_c| \quad (m \rightarrow \infty) \quad (13)$$

in the vicinity of the transition.

To verify the above theoretical arguments, we compare the size of the “virtual” giant component obtained from theory with the “real” giant component of the onion structure proposed in the previous section obtained by numerical simulation. We focus on the cases of networks with a power-law degree distribution (scale-free networks), where the degree distribution is represented by $P(k) \propto k^{-\lambda}$.

The results are shown in Fig. 2 for scale-free networks with $\lambda = 2.6$. For the total number of nodes N in these simulations, we take $N \approx 900$ for $K = 5$ and $N \approx 12\,000$ for $K = 10$ with $m = 2$ and $N \approx 900$ for $K = 5$ and $N \approx 20\,000$ for $K = 20$ with $m = 3$. The agreement is excellent and thus supporting the analytical results based on Eqs. (1) and (2). Note, as seen in Fig. 2, that the value of the maximum degree K does not play an important role for the improvement of the robustness against a targeted attack. This can be understood since the highest degree nodes represent a low fraction of the network nodes and are selectively removed in the targeted attack.¹

We also show in these figures the values of the giant component fraction of the uncorrelated (random) network with the same degree distribution as a function of the remaining

¹In order to verify the insensitivity of the robustness to the maximum degree K , all the numerical calculations of the analytical expressions in this article were also performed for $K = 500$ with the same values for other parameters. The reason for taking small values of K is to save time in the simulations for producing correlated networks.




FIG. 2. (Color online) Plots of the values of the “virtual” giant component S as a function of the remaining fraction of nodes p , obtained theoretically for extremely assortative scale-free networks specified by Eq. (4) for various values of the maximum degree K . The degree distribution is fixed to the power-law $k^{-\lambda}$ with an exponent $\lambda = 2.6$: (a) The giant component S for $m = 2$ and (b) S for $m = 3$. The values of S for networks with the onion structure obtained by both theory and numerical simulations as well as the giant component fraction of the corresponding uncorrelated random scale-free network for $K = 5$ are shown. In (a), the values of S for completely separated RR graphs (with no “bridges”) obtained by simulation are also added for $K = 10$ for comparison. Notice that the difference between the results for the onion structure and those of the separated RR graphs are small for $m = 2$ and $K = 10$. For $m = 3$, this difference is indistinguishable.

nodes. It is clear that the strong assortativity, obtained using the construction principle described in Sec. III, considerably improves the robustness of the scale-free network against targeted high-degree node removal.

V. A MODEL FOR INTERCONNECTED RANDOM REGULAR GRAPHS

A. The joint degree matrix

To investigate the effect of connections between random regular (RR) graphs and to study the robustness of onionlike structures analytically, we propose the following model where the joint degree-degree probability matrix is defined by

$$P(k, k') \propto \frac{kP(k)}{\langle k \rangle} \frac{k'P(k')}{\langle k \rangle} \exp\left[-\frac{(k-k')^2}{\sigma^2}\right], \quad (14)$$

which is normalized by the conditions $\sum_{k'} P(k, k') = kP(k)/\langle k \rangle$ and $\sum_{kk'} P(k, k') = 1$. This matrix, Eq. (14), contains a control parameter σ . In the limit, $\sigma \rightarrow 0$, the joint degree-degree matrix is that of separated RR graphs, Eq. (4), and in the limit, $\sigma \rightarrow \infty$, it approaches that of a completely random single uncorrelated network. Note that for any value of σ , the degree distribution $P(k)$ is fixed and given by the sum rule, $\sum_{k'} P(k, k') = kP(k)/\langle k \rangle$.

As mentioned earlier, an RR graph with $k = 2$ generally consists of many separated rings. Therefore, it is expected that until the control parameter for connection between RR graphs σ obtains a suitably large value, the largest connected component, which belongs to the $k = 2$ component, is not firmly connected to the larger degree ($k > m$) components. In Fig. 3, we show the fraction of the largest connected




FIG. 3. (Color online) The fraction of the largest connected component of scale-free networks with the exponent $\lambda = 2.6$, minimum degree $m = 2$, and maximum degrees $K = 10, 100$ as a function of the parameter σ , that controls the assortativity of the degree-degree correlation. Above $\sigma \approx 0.35$, the separated $k = 2$ components become connected to the larger degree components and the largest connected component spans the entire network.

component of a scale-free network specified by Eq. (14) with the exponent $\lambda = 2.6$, minimum degree $m = 2$, and maximum degrees $K = 10$ and 100 as a function of σ , which is obtained by numerical calculations using the analytical expressions, Eqs. (1) and (2). From this figure, we can see that for $m = 2$ we need $\sigma \gtrsim 0.35$ for the largest connected component to span the entire network. For $m \geq 3$, we find (not shown) that the largest connected component always spans the entire network for any non-negative value of σ .

B. The critical percolation threshold

The critical percolation threshold p_c is the minimum value of the remaining node fraction required for a unique giant component to be of the order of the entire network under a given way of node removal. The threshold p_c is a useful measure of the structural robustness of the network. A smaller value of p_c means that the network is more robust, since one needs to remove more nodes in order to destroy the giant component.

We calculate p_c using the theoretical framework described in Sec. II. For a given way of node removal, the critical point for the vanishing giant component is specified by the point at which the largest eigenvalue of the branching matrix $B_{kk'} = b_{k'} P(k'|k)(k' - 1)$ becomes unity [see Eq. (3)].

In Fig. 4, we plot the threshold p_c as a function of σ for several scale-free networks. For all calculations, the values of p_c deviate from those of the uncorrelated networks (seen at larger σ) and become smaller (more robust) as σ decreases and the strong assortative degree-degree correlation sets in. Finally the values of p_c converge to $P(2) + P(3)/2$ for the networks with $m = 2$ and to $P(3)/2$ with $m = 3$ in the range $\sigma \lesssim 1$, where m is the minimum degree.

The limiting values of p_c for small values of σ can be understood as follows. In the limit $\sigma \rightarrow 0$, the network tends to a set of separated random regular (RR) graphs for each degree. In this case there is no single giant component but a set of giant

components of each RR graph. For the case when the minimum degree is $m = 2$, the RR graph of the smallest degree ($k = 2$) is composed of “rings” and therefore always critical, which means the global connectivity of this component of $k = 2$ collapse as soon as even a single node from this component is removed. We can see this also from the fact that the critical node threshold for the random regular graph of $k = 2$ is $p_c = 1/(k - 1) = 1$. The giant component vanishes as soon as a node in the last remaining component ($k = 2$) containing the fraction $P(2)$ of nodes is removed. Thus, $p_c = P(2)$ for $\sigma = 0$. Above some positive finite value of σ , however, the separated RR graphs become interconnected (hierarchically). In this case, $\sigma > 0$, the smallest degree component ($k = 2$) of the whole network is connected to the $k = 3$ component. This connection breaks up the giant component in the RR graph for $k = 2$, since the $k = 2$ component is always critical. The final giant component collapse thus comes when the




FIG. 4. (Color online) Plots of the critical node threshold against a targeted high-degree node attack as a function of the parameter σ that controls the assortativity of the degree-degree correlation [see Eq. (14)] for several scale-free networks. (a) Scale-free networks with the exponent $\lambda = 2.6$ and minimum degree $m = 2$. The (blue) solid curve is for a network with maximum degree $K = 10$ and the (red) dotted curve is for $K = 100$. (b) Scale-free networks with $m = 2$ and $K = 100$. The (blue) solid curve is for $\lambda = 2.2$ and the (red) dotted curve is for $\lambda = 2.6$. (c) Scale-free networks with $\lambda = 2.6$ and $m = 3$. The (blue) solid curve is for $K = 10$ and the (red) dotted curve is for the network with $K = 100$. (d) Scale-free networks with $m = 3$ and $K = 100$. The (blue) solid curve is for $\lambda = 2.2$ and the (red) dotted curve is for $\lambda = 2.6$. For small values of σ , where the network structure approaches to be composed of weakly interconnected RR graphs, all critical node thresholds approach to $P(2) + P(3)/2$ for $m = 2$ and to $P(3)$ for $m = 3$. For all these cases, the giant component spans the entire network at the beginning of the node removal. Note that a smaller value of p_c generally means a more robust network structure.

global connectivity of the $k = 3$ component is lost. The threshold for the $k = 3$ component is $1/(k - 1) = 1/2$. Thus, the critical node threshold at the collapse is expected to be $p_c = P(2) + P(3)/2$ for $\sigma > 0$ [see Figs. 4(a) and 4(b)]. Since for $\sigma = 0$, $p_c = P(2)$, there is a discontinuity of p_c for $m = 2$ at $\sigma = 0$. Note that in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) for $m = 2$, we only show the giant components for $\sigma \gtrsim 0.35$ where the largest connected component spans the entire network.

For $m \geq 3$, the last remaining giant component is that of the smallest degree network which is not critical for any nonzero value of σ . The critical node threshold at the collapse of the giant component is, therefore, $p_c = P(m)/(m - 1)$ [see Eq. (7), Figs. 4(c) and 4(d)]. We have also checked the continuity of the threshold as a function of σ by numerically calculating p_c for $\sigma \gtrsim 0.01$.

It is clear that when we only consider the robustness against targeted high-degree node attack the limit $\sigma \rightarrow 0$ always gives the most robust structure, which is the minimally interconnected RR graphs.

C. Giant component collapse

In Fig. 5, we show the way the giant component collapses for various values of σ for scale-free networks with an exponent, $\lambda = 2.6$. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) correspond to a network with $m = 2$ and Figs. 5(c) and 5(d) correspond to a network with $m = 3$. Note that for $m = 2$ the giant component corresponds to a network composed of nodes mainly with the minimum degree, $m = 2$. It is therefore at the edge of criticality for extremely assortative correlation ($\sigma \rightarrow 0$). This is the reason for the sudden collapse of the giant component in the vicinity of infinitesimal removal of node by random attack, which is represented by the solid curve for $\sigma = 0.4$ in Fig. 5(b).

From Figs. 5(a) and 5(c) which represent the cases of targeted attack, we can see that the strong assortative degree-degree correlation that leads to the structure of weakly interconnected random regular graphs yields much smaller values of p_c , which is $P(2) + P(3)/2$ for $m = 2$ and $P(3)/2$ for $m = 3$, compared to the corresponding uncorrelated networks. We also see from Figs. 5(a) and 5(c) that, for $p > p_c$, $S \approx p$ when $\sigma \lesssim 1$ until the sharp decrease in S near p_c sets in. This means that in this case the removal of high-degree nodes does not affect the connectivity of the remaining giant component and that the networks for $\sigma \lesssim 1$ have almost the maximum robustness against a targeted attack.

From Figs. 5(b) and 5(d), we can see that the giant component decreases faster in the early stages of the random node removal, while the values of the critical node threshold are slightly lower from those of random networks due to the assortative degree-degree correlation.

The decrease of σ has, therefore, opposite effects in terms of the giant component collapse with respect to targeted and random attacks. For a targeted attack, the collapse of the giant component is maximally suppressed ($S \approx p$) for small values of $\sigma \lesssim 1$, while for a random attack the collapse sets in earlier compared to the cases of uncorrelated (random) networks. This fact means that there must be an optimal value of σ that considers both targeted and random attacks. The structure of the network at this σ suppresses the giant component collapse




FIG. 5. (Color online) Plots of the giant component fraction S as a function of the fraction of the remaining nodes p for several values of σ . The plots for the scale-free networks with $\lambda = 2.6$, $m = 2$, and $K = 10$ are (a) for targeted attack and (b) for random attack. The plots for the scale-free networks with $\lambda = 2.6$, $m = 3$, and $K = 10$ are (c) for targeted attack and (d) for random attack. For comparison, we also plot in (a) and (c) the curves of the giant component for uncorrelated networks and the curves for random regular (RR) networks where all degrees are the same as the average degree $\langle k \rangle$ of the corresponding scale-free networks. The lines $S = p$ in (a) and (c) are guides for eyes and represent an optimal network.

as much as possible for a targeted attack as well as maintaining a significant size of the giant component for a random attack.

D. Robustness optimization

To identify the optimal structure for both targeted and random attacks we propose the following approach. In Fig. 6, we show schematic profiles of the giant component fraction as a function of p for two possible scenarios motivated by the curves appearing in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b). The case represented by Fig. 6(a) has a larger value of the critical node threshold p_c than that of Fig. 6(b). On the other hand a large fraction of the giant component collapse after removal of a small fraction of nodes for the case (b) in contrast to (a). From the viewpoint of the macroscopic connectivity, the value of the area under the curve $S(p)$ represented by R is a better measure of the robustness, as proposed by Schneider *et al.* [37,38], compared to the critical node threshold p_c , and we apply this measure in the following. Note that this measure R has the absolute upper bound of 0.5.




FIG. 6. Schematic profiles of the giant component as a function of the remaining node fraction, p , for the two typical cases. The case (a) has a larger value of the critical node threshold p_c than (b), but the giant component collapse for (a) occurs much slower than for the case (b). From the viewpoint of the global connectivity, the value of the area below $S(p)$ represented by R is a better measure of the robustness than the critical threshold p_c .

Since we are considering the total robustness against both targeted and random attacks, we define the total robustness measure R_{tot} as the sum of the robustness measure for targeted attack and that for random attack. Defining the total measure as the sum of the robustness measures against both types of attacks is also found in earlier literature [24–26]. Note that the maximum value of R_{tot} equals to unity for networks with optimal robustness in which $p_c = 0$ and $S = p$ for both targeted and random attacks.

Figure 7 shows R_{tot} as a function of σ for two scale-free networks. The plot in Fig. 7(a) is for a scale-free network with $\lambda = 2.6$, $m = 2$, and $K = 10$. The measure, R_{tot} , reaches the maximum value of approximately 0.54 at $\sigma_{\text{opt}} \approx 1.33$. Figure 7(b) is for a scale-free network with $\lambda = 2.6$, $m = 3$, and $K = 10$. The measure, R_{tot} , reaches the maximum value of approximately 0.8715 at $\sigma_{\text{opt}} \approx 0.646$. Noticing that the limit $\sigma \rightarrow 0$ leads to the separated random regular (RR) networks and that σ is the measure of the maximum degree difference of connected nodes [see Eq. (14)], the fact that $\sigma_{\text{opt}} \approx 1$ for both cases of $m = 2$ and $m = 3$ indicates that the optimal network structure is the one where most of the




FIG. 7. The values of the total robustness measure R_{tot} as a function of σ for two scale-free networks. Plot (a) is for a scale-free network with $\lambda = 2.6$, $m = 2$, and $K = 10$ and plot (b) is for a scale-free network with $\lambda = 2.6$, $m = 3$, and $K = 10$. The numerically obtained optimal values of σ that maximize R_{tot} are $\sigma = 1.33$ for $m = 2$ and $\sigma = 0.646$ for $m = 3$.

k -degree nodes are connected with each other and only a small fraction of remaining k -degree nodes are connected with $(k - 1)$ - or $(k + 1)$ -degree nodes. We find here again the onionlike structure. The reason that σ_{opt} for $m = 2$ is larger than the one for $m = 3$ is due to the criticality of the smallest degree component of $k = 2$.

In Fig. 8, we plot the giant components for targeted and random attacks as a function of p for the optimally correlated scale-free networks with $\lambda = 2.6$ and $K = 10$ for the cases $m = 2$ ($\sigma = 1.33$) and $m = 3$ ($\sigma = 0.646$). In all plots, the theoretical values of the giant component fraction are represented by full curves. The critical node thresholds for a targeted attack are $P(2) + P(3)/2$ for $m = 2$ and $P(3)/2$ for $m = 3$, respectively. For comparison, we also plot the curves for the corresponding uncorrelated scale-free network with the same parameters and for the RR network of the same degree as the average degree of the corresponding scale-free networks. These results show that the robustness of scale-free networks against a targeted attack can be significantly improved up to nearly maximal by taking the structure of weakly interconnected RR graphs (onionlike structures) without much undermining their robustness against random failure.

For testing our theoretical considerations, we also simulate actual networks according to the joint degree matrix, Eq. (14), with the optimal values of σ , which are 1.33 for $m = 2$ and 0.646 for $m = 3$. The circles in Fig. 8 are obtained by direct node removal from the simulated optimal networks. For each realization, the number of nodes for $m = 2$ is 6993 and for $m = 3$ is 2795. The agreement between the simulation results and the theoretical calculations is excellent.

VI. SUMMARY

As a strong candidate for the optimal structure against both types of attacks, random and targeted, with a given degree distribution, the structure consisting of hierarchically interconnected random regular graphs is proposed and thoroughly investigated based on exact analytical expressions. This network structure has a close relationship with the “onionlike




FIG. 8. (Color online) Plots of the optimal giant component S as a function of p for scale-free networks with $\lambda = 2.6$ and $K = 10$. For plots (a) targeted attack and (b) random attack, $m = 2$ and the optimal value is $\sigma = 1.33$. For plots (c) targeted attack and (d) random attack, $m = 3$ and the optimal value is $\sigma = 0.646$. In all plots, the theoretical values for the giant component are represented by full curves. The critical node thresholds for a targeted attack are $P(2) + P(3)/2$ for $m = 2$ and $P(3)/2$ for $m = 3$. We also plot, for comparison, the curves for the corresponding uncorrelated scale-free network with the same values of parameters (dashed curves) and for the RR network with the same degree as the average degree of the corresponding scale-free network (dotted curves). The (blue) circles are obtained from simulation of a single realization for each of the optimal networks generated from the joint degree-degree matrix, Eq. (14), for the optimal value of $\sigma = 1.33$ with $N = 6993$ and $m = 2$ and for the optimal value of $\sigma = 0.646$ with $N = 2795$ and $m = 3$.

structure” found by Schneider *et al.* [37,38] using numerical simulations and exhibits an extremely assortative degree-degree correlation, in which a node of certain degree has a strong tendency to be linked with nodes of the same degree. We derive a set of exact expressions that enable us to calculate the critical node threshold and the giant component fraction for arbitrary types of node removal, in which the degree-degree correlation is fully incorporated. To test the robustness of this structure, we apply the theory to the case of scale-free networks that have a well-known vulnerability against a targeted attack. The results show that the vulnerability of a scale-free network can be significantly reduced by taking the network structure proposed here without much undermining its almost complete robustness against a random attack. We also

investigate the detail of the robustness enhancement of scale-free networks due to assortative degree-degree correlation by introducing a joint degree-degree probability matrix that interpolates between an uncorrelated network structure and the structure with strong assortativity by tuning a single control parameter. The optimal values of the control parameter that maximize the robustness against simultaneous random and targeted attacks are also determined and those optimal values support the maximal robustness of the “onionlike structure.” Our analytical calculations are supported by numerical simulations.

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